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CONSIDER THE CONSEQUENCES 
Martha Minow* 
THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECO· 
NOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA. 
By Lenore J. Weitzman. New York: The Free Press. 1985. Pp. xxiv, 
504. $19.95. 
[K]nowledge is like a staircase built in such a way that every landing 
offers a view of yet another one, to which one can't help wanting to 
ascend. No one will ever be totally satisfied because knowledge is also 
an endless spiral. 
Well, son, I'll tell you: 
Life for me ain't been no crystal stair. 
It's had tacks in it, 
And splinters, 
And boards tom up, 
And places with no carpet on the floor -
Bare. 
But all the time 
I'se been a-climbin' on, 
And reachin' landin's, 
And tumin' comers, 
And sometimes goin' in the dark 
Where there ain't been no light. 
-A. Memmi1 
- Langston Hughes2 
We learn too late. And yet we have to keep on going. This book 
offers both lessons. Professor Lenore Weitzman reveals the often dev-
astating economic consequences of recent divorce reforms for children 
and women. By studying what California divorce reform has meant 
financially and socially to the men, women, and children affected by it, 
Professor Weitzman shows that reform can have disturbing and unan-
ticipated consequences. In so doing, she presses a persuasive case for 
new reforms - with no guarantee of avoiding new, unanticipated 
consequences. 
Although focused on the California experience, the book offers in-
formation that bears relevance to the rest of the country.3 Most states 
* Assistant Professor, Harvard Law School. A.B. 1975, University of Michigan; Ed.M. 
1976, Harvard University; J.D. 1979, Yale University. - Ed. 
1. A. MEMMI, DEPENDENCE 81 (1984). 
2. Mother to Son, in SELECTED POEMS OF LANGSTON HUGHES 187 (1959). 
3. The cost of the book is unfortunately too high to fit the budget of many of the women 
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have followed California's lead in introducing no-fault divorce, di-
vorce without spousal consent, reduction or elimination of financial 
compensation or retribution, preference for joint child custody, and 
elimination of gender-based duties and rights.4 Thus, the California 
experience seems not an oddity but the leading edge of a trend. If the 
picture offered by Lenore Weitzman holds any prediction for other 
places, it is a stark warning about how recent divorce reforms produce 
unintended but potentially disastrous consequences for women and 
children. 
Using the data and insights gathered in The Divorce Revolution, I 
will summarize those consequences and then ask: Why were they un-
expected? What can we learn now to reduce surprise - and dismay 
- in the next rounds of divorce law reform? Can we learn to antici-
pate how opposition to reform persists despite official success, and 
how competing possible meanings for central concepts, like equality 
and freedom, may yield unexpected consequences? 
I. THE UNEXPECTED CONSEQUENCES 
California first introduced no-fault grounds for divorce; the Cali-
fornia legislature initiated efforts to reduce or eliminate gender distinc-
tions in family roles, entitlements, and obligations following divorce, 
and California then led national experiments with joint custody. The 
Divorce Revolution asks, what effects have these reforms had on the 
economic and social welfare of Californians who go through divorce? 
The book's stark and at times startling findings deserve the publicity 
they have been receiving. Based on a rich variety of data sources, 5 
Weitzman found that: 
described in the book; fortunately, widespread media coverage of its findings has already begun 
to transform public understanding of the consequences of divorce. 
4. California's 1970 no-fault divorce law was the first in Western legal systems to abolish 
fault as the basis for marital dissolution. P. 15. By 1985, all but one state had some form of no-
fault divorce. P. 41. Over a dozen states permit one party to demand the divorce, without the 
other spouse's consent. Pp. 41-43. Twelve states expressly preclude fault in assessments of ali-
mony, and most others simply omit fault from the factors to be used in awarding alimony. Pp. 
43-44. Nearly all states now use a gender-neutral standard, such as "best interests of the child," 
in determining child custody following divorce, and by January 1985, some 30 states had fol-
lowed California's lead in 1980 in authorizing - or preferring - some version of joint custody. 
Pp. 49-50. Other developments favdring gender neutrality have occurred in alimony and prop-
erty division rules. Pp. 44-49, 143-83. 
5. Weitzman describes her methodology both in an introduction and in methodological ap-
pendices. In essence, the book draws on five kinds of research data: "systematic random sam-
ples of2,500 court dockets over a ten-year period; systematic in-depth interviews with 169 family 
law attorneys; similar interviews with 44 family law judges; a comparative sample of English 
legal experts; and systematic in-depth interviews with 228 divorced men and women." P. xviii. 
This review does not attempt to evaluate Weitzman's methodology. It does seem, however, that 
this book avoids obvious mistakes in drawing up the size of samples and in administering statisti-
cal techniques - and it also avoids the common social science error of favoring statistics over 
people's reflections on their own experiences. The book in addition successfully provides clear 
and cogent summaries of its research findings. 
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- "[O]n the average, divorced women and the minor children in 
their households experience a 73 percent decline in their standard of 
living in the first year after divorce" (p. xii). 6 
- "Their former husbands, in contrast, experience a 42 percent 
rise in their standard of living" (p. xii). 7 
- Although the new rules for dividing marital property embrace a 
principle of equality, the courts typically exclude from the division the 
most valuable assets - "the major wage earner's salary, pension, med-
ical insurance, education, license, the goodwill value of a business or 
profession, entitlements to company goods and services, and future 
earning power" (p. xiii). s 
- "[T]hose displaced homemakers who had been married to up-
per-income men stood a good chance of being awarded the support 
that the new law [protecting women in long-term marriages] promised 
them. But those who had been married to lower-income men did not" 
(p. 189). 
- "[W]ithin six months of the divorce decree, one out of six men 
was already in arrears on alimony payments, owing, on the average, 
over $1,000" (p. 192). 
- Judges have interpreted reforms requiring equal division of 
property assets upon divorce to force the sale of many family homes, 
effectively dislocating women and children from old neighborhoods, 
schools, and friends (pp. 358-59). 
- Although there is a "steadfast persistence of mother custody 
awards despite the change" from maternal preference in child custody 
(p. 232), "by 1977, a surprisingly large proportion - close to two-
thirds - of the fathers who requested custody were awarded it" (p. 
233).9 
- Despite the legal preference for joint custody, introduced by 
California in 1980, "[m]ost men - and most women - prefer not to 
share postdivorce parenting" (p. 251). 
- "More than half (53 percent) of the millions of women who are 
due child support do not receive the court-ordered support" (p. 262). 
- Using national census data compiled in 1981, "the mean 
amount of [child] support ordered was $2,460, but the mean amount 
paid, including those who received nothing, was $1,510" (p. 265).to 
6. See also p. 338. Weitzman also reports a study by Michigan researchers which showed 
that "[d]ivorced men lost 19 percent in income while divorced women lost 29 percent. In con· 
trast, married men and women experienced a 22 percent rise in income." P. 337 (summarizing 
Hoffman & Holmes, Husbands, Wives, and Divorce, in FIVE THOUSAND AMERICAN FAMILIES 
- PATIERNS OF EcONOMIC PROGRESS (Institute for Social Research 1976)) (footnotes omitted). 
7. See also p. 338. 
8. See also pp. 97-142. 
9. See also p. 257 (67 to 68% of custody arrangements under the 1980 joint custody prefer-
ence law still placed physical custody of the child with the mother). 
10. Weitzman also reports that "[t]hese amounts are lower than those for divorced women 
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- "[N]o matter what his income level, a divorced man is rarely 
ordered to part with more than one-third of his net income" - even 
though "the judges and the attorneys we interviewed often referred to 
a one-half limit: they said there was an informal rule that judges 
should never require a man to pay more than one-half of his net in-
come in support" (p. 266). 
In short, California's divorce reforms, which were supposed to 
eliminate the trauma - and the gender discrimination consequences 
- of divorce, have instead in effect drastically reduced the financ~al 
security previously available to women and children under older di-
vorce rules. In addition, nonenforcement of even the reduced financial 
benefits under these reforms further contributes to divorce's crushing 
effects for women and children. The patterns of inequality, unfairness, 
and constraints for divorced families unearthed by the book are all the 
more stunning when located within the broader demographic picture 
of divorce rates: not only will at least half of current American mar-
riages end in divorce (p. xvii); "[t]he total number of children affected 
by divorce has more than tripled since 1960 .... [I]t is now projected 
that more than half of all the children in the United States will experi-
ence a parental divorce or dissolution before they reach age eighteen" 
(p. 215, emphasis in original). 
Weitzman offers some useful analysis that helps to explicate the 
meaning of her findings. For example, she explains that despite the 
promise that no-fault divorce would replace old gender-based rules 
with a conception of the equal marital partners, gender inequality after 
divorce nevertheless emerged because the partner caring for children 
has to spread her half of the family resources to cover the children as 
well as herself. Because the child care is typically managed by one 
partner, and because that partner statistically is generally the woman, 
it is women who are the financial victims of divorce. 
Further, the division of assets at divorce frequently has yielded too 
little for the woman and children because the division did not reach 
the couple's career and educational investments - forms of "new 
property."11 It is true that some reforms eliminated rules that seemed 
to express and reinforce sexist stereotypes - like alimony from a hus-
band to support a woman presumed incapable of supporting herself. 
But these reforms left completely unprotected .many women whose 
lives actually fit a sexist stereotype (p. 360). Freed of gendered role 
because they include awards to never-married women for whom compliance is even lower." P. 
265. 
11. Expectation interests in future income streams connected with employment or public or 
private benefits - expectations based on employment contracts, pensions, professional licenses, 
and the like - have been described as "new property" by Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 
YALE L.J. 733 (1964), and by MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROP-
ERTY (1981). 
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expectations, the conception of marital partnership seems to dissolve 
into an ideology and a practice of autonomous individualism (p. 374). 
How could major law reform produce such dismal results? Why 
were these results unexpected? Why did the reformers fail to antici-
pate these results? TI!e following section investigates these questions 
using the California divorce reform experience, reported by Professor 
Weitzman, as a case study. 
II. WHY WERE THE CONSEQUENCES UNEXPECTED? 
Professor Weitzman offers several hypotheses to explain why the 
reformers failed to anticipate the bad consequences of the divorce re-
forms for women and children. One reason for their failure, she 
speculates, grows from their lack of information and their actual mis-
information about how the divorce processes worked and affected par-
ticipants before the reforms. 12 Weitzman also underscores, 
persuasively, how the reformers were preoccupied with the negative 
aspects of the prevailing divorce system. Reformers especially ad-
dressed the hostility and lies generated by the adversary process (p. 
363). How often, indeed, has reform depended for both motive and 
energy on the negative assaults on what is, rather than the affirmative 
vision of what could be.13 Weitzman also attributes some of the unin-
tended consequences to beliefs, held by reformers, that legal equality 
could secure actual equality between men and women (pp. 363, 365). 
Instead, social conditions that create inequality remained, despite the 
legal changes, and "the legislation of equality actually resulted in a 
worsened position for women and, by extension, a worsened position 
for children" (p. 365). 
All but this last reason treat the problem of unintended conse-
quences as a problem of policy formation: if only the reformers knew 
enough about the world and spent enough time designing the future 
policies, they could have avoided errors and preoccupations with the 
12. Pp. 362, 364 (reformers lacked information and confronted myths about women who 
demanded exhorbitant alimony and property awards). Weitzman does not explore how some 
political actors actually may have relied on these gaps and myths in supporting the reforms -
and justified this support as a way to improve men's situations following divorce. 
13. See, e.g., G. HIMMELFARB, THE IDEA OF POVERTY: ENGLAND IN THE EARLY INDUS· 
TRIAL AGE 147-76 (1983) (reform of Poor Law rested on indictment of the past); R. Wll!BE, THE 
OPENING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 18 (1984) (revolutionary leaders in America frequently relied 
on terms of negation to define the new, independent America: genuine American character, thus, 
simply was not European). Although assaulting the past and present does not expressly invoke 
visions for the future, the very assertion of negativity may be a powerful expression of belief that 
the way things are isn't natural and inevitable, and therefore things could change. See L. PEAT· 
TIE & M. REIN, WOMEN'S CLAIMS: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 26-35 (1983). 
Weitzman also observes how the California divorce reforms, which promised to solve all 
problems with divorce, created a set-up for disappointment. P. 18. Garnering support by invok· 
ing all disappointments and frustrations with the past, reformers invite disappointment with the 
future - but also invite those in the future to dream. 
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past. 14 Weitzmari.'s last hypothesis - that the reformers failed to ad-
dress broad social conditions making men and' women unequal and 
made things worse by enacting formal equality in the narrow realm of 
divorce and custody reform - suggests to me more powerful and per-
suasive reasons for unanticipated consequences of law reform efforts. 
These deeper reasons for unanticipated consequences grow in part 
from the sources of actual opposition to reform. Such sources of op-
position persist despite official success. Deeper reasons for unantici-
pated consequences also arise from the conceptual confusion behind 
central reform ideas, like the meanings of equality and freedom. 
Thus, I believe that law reform may yield unexpected conse-
quences for at least two reasons. First, the reforms, although well-
conceived, may encounter barriers to implementation due to human 
and institutional opposition. 15 Failures to confront and overcome 
these barriers can compound the problem. Second, the reforms may 
suffer from insensitivity to competing goals and complexity within any 
given goal. The California divorce reform experience illustrates both 
the barriers to implementation and competing normative possibilities 
that, in retrospect, help to explain the unexpected consequences. 
A. Consequences of Reform Include Continuing Opposition and 
Barriers to Implementation 
Law reformers pay too little attention to what happens after new 
legislation is adopted, or after a new judicial decision is announced. 
What happens then is another round of political battles in the world of 
implementation - and nonimplementation; compliance and noncom-
pliance. In this world, formal legal rules encounter people's attitudes 
and social practices. Struggles over whether old or new practices will 
prevail continue the politics of lawmaking on terrains beyond the leg-
islature. Some of the unexpected results of the California divorce re-
form grow from just these struggles. The reformers' visions 
encountered weak or ineffective enforcement mechanisms; entrenched 
social and personal attitudes among parties, lawyers, and judges; and 
patterns of behavior at odds with the assumptions of the legislation 
itself. Examining these obstacles should be an essential step in the 
design of any new legislation: We may learn something about barriers 
to implementing the next round of reforms by considering the barriers 
encountered in California. Meanwhile, we should recognize that the 
14. See generally R. NEUSTADT & E. MAY, THINKING IN TIME: THE USES OF HISTORY 
FOR DECISION-MAKERS (1986) (developing a methodology for using facts of the past to develop 
better future policy). ' 
15. See generally w. MUIR, PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: LAW AND ATIITUDE 
CHANGE (1967); J. PRESSMAN & A. WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION (1973). See also Forbath, 
Hartog & Minow, Introduction: Legal Histories From Below, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 759 (law in-
cludes contests over legal meanings in the enforcement as well as in the formation of legal 
policy). 
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meaning of law reform depends to a great extent on whether the spirit 
and vision of the reformers can successfully do battle with the prevail-
ing, resisting practices.16 
Some barriers to implementing divorce reform were implicit in the 
enforcement problems prevailing even before the reforms. 17 For ex-
ample, the problem of unenforced child support decrees existed before 
the California reforms.18 More recent efforts at both the national and 
state levels19 specifically target child support enforcement and estab-
lish more powerful methods for collection, and yet even these methods 
have not been entirely successful. Interestingly, Weitzman found that 
"most men are willing to pay child support but they have a hard time 
parting with the money if they are given a choice" (p. 305). Thus, 
enforcement methods that leave the actual payment of child support to 
the parent's voluntary action meet a barrier that can be avoided 
through more automatic measures, like wage deductions.20 People 
think they can get away with not paying child support; in fact, they 
are right, and in fact, they do. They avoid paying child support due to 
personal resentments toward custodial spouses, low administrative pri-
ority given to child support delinquency, and societal devaluations of 
children and childrearing. These attitudes are the winners in the poli-
tics of law reform, thus far. 
Yet other barriers arise from the attitudes of specific parties, law-
yers, and judges involved in divorce disputes - attitudes people use to 
resist or mutate the changes announced by law reform. For example, 
a husband who simply refuses to pay alimony can pose a serious obsta-
cle not only to implementing an alimony award, but to securing it in 
the first place.21 Similarly, lawyers can play a large role in convincing 
16. Cf. Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (citing police's 
and clerk's failures to process charges of spouse abuse), revd., 64 A.D.2d 582, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 
(1978), ajfd., 41 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979). 
17. A similar point is that criticisms of the distribution of alimony awards under the re· 
formed California laws may rest on false views of alimony before the reforms. Thus, while criti· 
cizing alimony reform's effects on older housewives, Weitzman also emphasizes that older 
housewives were not 'justly rewarded" under the old laws. P. 183. 
18. See generally pp. 283-307. 
19. Pp. 307-10. Amendments to the Social Security Act thus provide for collection of child 
support for families on welfare; other federal laws authorize national searches of data to locate 
delinquent parents, and use of tax refunds to intercept sources for child support payments. State 
reforms permit liens, wage garnishment, and jail; and the federal government now subsidizes 
state enforcement efforts. In addition, by making child support enforcement a priority target for 
its members and cooperating lawyers, the National Organization for Women's Education and 
Legal Defense Fund may supply the missing energy needed to implement these enforcement 
reforms. 
20. See also D. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY (1979) (concluding that enforcement 
mechanisms that combine self-starting public machinery and serious sanctions produce better 
results than enforcement strategies that rely on private party enforcement and use less serious 
sanctions). 
21. See pp. 160-62. This practical fact also reveals a conceptual weakness in the reformers' 
understanding of alimony as an "award" or compensation to the women rather than as her 
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women that a husband who opposes alimony will probably prevail, 
and the lawyers thereby help to deter women's countervailing legal 
claims (p. 163). Lawyers also betray failures of commitment and im-
agination in pursuing enforcement of child support orders.22 
Further, judges who persist in basing their alimony and child sup-
port awards on assessments of what they think the husband can afford 
- rather than what the wife or child may need - interpose a set of 
attitudes not prescribed by law that nonetheless powerfully determine 
actual results (p. 183). Women perceive judges as generally unsympa-
thetic to their efforts to enforce child support orders, and with some 
good reasons (pp. 292-93). Although judges generally do not forgive 
legally enforceable debts, the judges in Weitzman's study responded to 
questionnaires that they would forgive rather than force delinquent 
parents to pay the arrearages of unpaid child support. Again, judicial 
attitudes impede the implementation of the law on the books, and help 
explain the disastrous financial status of many women and children 
following divorce (pp. 292, 302). 
Another attitudinal and behavioral pattern - the continued domi-
nance of women as primary parents - undermines the vision of joint 
custody and the associated economic arrangements embodied in the 
reform laws. For although there are arguments - based on theories 
of child development, women's rights, and men's rights - that sup-
port a reallocation of child care from women alone to both men and 
women,23 the evidence gathered by Weitzman suggests that women 
and men both choose to place major child care responsibilities after 
divorce with the mother.24 Eliminating a legal rule guaranteeing this 
result may mean that a divorcing woman now has to give something 
earnings from her investment in the marriage. Weitzman suggests this alternative conception. P. 
360. An even stronger statement of this conception would identify the health, career, and finan-
cial benefits to the man in a marriage as specific returns on the woman's investment - often 
supplied by her sacrifice of personal health, career, and financial benefits. 
22. Pp. 287-89, 303-04. Weitzman found that lawyers generally know about wage assign-
ments but many responded to hypothetical questions about enforcement by preferring to seek 
voluntary compliance for child support awards. Indeed, "only 1 percent of the women's attor-
neys sought wage attachments in contrast with the 61 percent who said this is what should be 
done in response to noncompliance in the hypothetical case." P. 304. 
23. See N. CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING (1978); Polikoff, Gender and 
Child-Custody Determinations: Exploding the Myths, in FAMILIES, POLITICS AND PUBLIC POL-
ICY 183, 190 (I. Diamond ed. 1983). See generally Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules 
for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1984) (reviewing what studies do and do 
not tell us about the consequences of male or female single parenthood and the effects of joint 
custody arrangements). 
24. Pp. 216-17. Why is this so? It could be that men and women continue to believe that 
mothers are better or "more natural" parents than fathers; it could be that mothers for psycho-
logical and sociological reasons place greater priority on childrearing than on other things they 
could do with their time - and fathers place less; it could be that people fear changes in gender 
roles and fear societal disapproval should they take on untraditional roles. It also could be that 
people fear equality. Cf J. HOCHSCHILD, WHAT'S FAIR: AMERICAN BELIEFS ABOUT DISTRIB-
UTIVE JUSTICE 21 (1981) (citing studies suggesting that American workers may fear or distrust 
social and economic equality). 
908 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:900 
else up in order to negotiate this arrangement. What else does she 
have to relinquish? How about adequate financial support for herself 
or for the kids (p. 361)? A man may even use the threat of opposing 
her proposal to provide primary care for the children as a way to force 
financial concessions - either because he actually stands a chance of 
defeating her, or because the very threat of a fight violates her sense of 
what would be good for herself and the children.25 The politics of 
child custody battles, then, may pit men who do not really want cus-
tody against women who do, even as the spouses dispute custody as 
part of a larger struggle to reorganize their lives. The ultimate Califor-
nia reform - giving a presumption in favor of joint legal custody -
similarly disables the woman who wants, and probably will get, physi-
cal custody of the child: she has no bargaining chip or basis for secur-
ing financial benefits under this rule, which in essence leaves the actual 
practical details of child care beyond the scope of the legal decree.26 
Here in fuller form is the reason why changes in formal legal 
equality between men and women do not themselves usher in changes 
in lived inequalities, and indeed, why formal legal equality can dis-
empower women from improving their circumstances. The struggle 
for gender equality is a struggle that must be waged at the level of 
assumptions and attitudes - and of actual social and economic prac-
tices in childrearing and in the workplace. Formal legal changes in 
such items as child-custody preferences could supply a focus for mo-
bilizing such struggles, but they could also disable individual women 
in their personal efforts to improve their situations.27 
Where, then, should law reform efforts now push on the issue of 
divorce custody? Weitzman and others identify the virtues of a "pri-
mary parent" presumption that could recognize the actual social prac-
tices without confining women and men to traditional roles (pp. 244-
45), although disputes over who has been the primary parent in fami-
lies with two truly involved parents could be difficult. Indeed, if 
parenting patterns change and fathers become more involved in the 
daily care of their children, a primary parent test could become at best 
irrelevant, and at worst a punishment for women whose husbands 
share the mothering tasks. 2s 
Another implementation barrier may be altered in time. The di-
25. See p. 235; see also 1 Kings 3:16-28 (the judgment of Solomon: parents' motives for 
avoiding-child-custody battle include desire to protect the child from the costs of divisiveness). 
26. Pp. 253-56, 258-60, 361. Weitzman does explore the increasing - but still minority -
instances of joint physical custody, in which the child rotates between parents during the week. 
Pp. 251-53. 
27. See generally Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 
96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1535-38 (1983). 
28. "Mothering" still connotes nurturing and daily caretaking of children; changes in social 
practices may someday transform the meaning of "fathering" to include parenting, not just the 
biological act of siring a child. See L. POGREBIN, FAMILY POLITICS 205 (1983). 
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vorce reforms for the most part contemplate that both spouses will be 
able to earn reasonable incomes, even though many currently divorc-
ing couples assumed before and during their marriages that the wife 
would not work outside the home. The premises of equal treatment 
upon divorce thus work to the disadvantage of the woman who has 
not worked outside the home during the marriage. She may be further 
disadvantaged by a lack of workplace skills - and various forms of 
sex discrimination - if she seeks work after the divorce; the divorce 
rules embracing formal equality fail to acknowledge how women may 
be systematically disadvantaged in the marketplace, after divorce. 
Some of Weitzman's findings suggest that a two-tiered divorce system 
- with one set of rules for couples conforming to traditional gender 
expectations and another set of rules for hypothesized 1980s-style 
dual-career, dual-parenting couples - could take care of the worst 
applications of current law.29 The first tier could function like a 
grandparenting clause until all couples meet the 1980s model. Per-
haps, in time, most couples will come to expect that both spouses must 
be able to earn a living. These expectations would then comport with 
the reforms limiting alimony and providing for equal division of mari-
tal assets. Treating the problem as merely a time-lag, however, dan-
gerously obscures the normative question: should law reform presume 
and push for a world in which both spouses must be independent, 
financially? 
This normative question exposes shortcomings in the conception of 
equality adopted by the reforms - a conception insensitive to the va-
ried social arrangements we could devise to give meaning to equality. 
These conceptual limitations, I will suggest, grew from the reformers' 
neglect not only of the actual social and economic contexts in which 
the law gives meaning to equality and freedom, but also of the contexts 
that could enable new roles and family lives. The next sections turn to 
consider these conceptual limitations while exposing how competing 
conceptions of norms like equality and freedom provide bases for con-
tinuing criticism of legal practices. 
B. The Unintended Consequences Express Multiple Meanings of 
Equality 
As the last section has already suggested, the meanings of equality 
are complicated and multiple. Law reformers pursuing equality thus 
may encounter results they did not plan because some meanings pre-
vailed over others or because many of equality's meanings got lost in 
the contest. What contrasting meanings of equality are potentially at 
odds in divorce law reform? Already obvious from the discussion of 
29. "[T)he reformers did not foresee that the equality they had in mind for a childless divor-
cee of twenty-five would be used to terminate alimony for a fifty-five-year-old housewife who had 
never held a paying job." P. 366. 
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obstacles to implementation are the contrasts between the idea of for-
mal legal equality (eliminating gender preferences and disadvantages 
in official legal rules) and practical equality (eliminating gender-based 
differentials in the burdens and benefits actually distributed in people's 
lives). Reforms achieving formal equality could well ignore or exacer-
bate structural inequalities between men and women in the economy 
and in social roles (p. 35). And reforms achieving formal equality for 
men and women in the spheres of family roles and family financial 
interests could well leave in place - or worsen - inequalities in the 
spheres of employment and public roles. Jo 
Another already apparent set of contrasting meanings for equality 
arises from ambiguity about whom the law is supposed to treat 
equally. Are all women to be treated the same, including the twenty-
five year old with a professional degree and no children, on the one 
hand; and the fifty-five year old with three children and no experience 
in the paid labor market, on the other? Or are men and women of 
comparable age and work experience to be treated the same, and those 
with· differences along these lines to be accorded different treatment? 
Are women to be treated as though they were men, in terms of ex-
pected job participation and earning capacity? Or are traditional wo-
men's roles as homemakers and caretakers of children to be given 
value equal to traditional men's work? If so, equal to which men's 
work?31 A major problem, then, with the idea of equality is: Which 
people, according to which characteristics, are to be compared and 
treated comparably?Jz 
By exposing such competing meanings of equality, I do not mean 
to imply that one is right, or that holding inconsistent meanings is a 
sign of bad thinking. Indeed, the inconsistencies in the world we have 
made suggest that inconsistent ideas may be less confused than consis-
30. See Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change. A 
Study of Rhetoric and Results in the Regulation of the Consequences of Divorce, 1983 Wis. L. 
REV. 789; Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 
59 B.U. L. REV. 55 (1979); see also K. FERGUSON, THE FEMINIST CASE AGAINST BUREAU· 
CRACY (1984) (exploring feminist concerns ignored by employment practices, and inexpressable 
in terms of sheer "same treatment" as men). 
31. Cf T. MOI, SEXUAL/TEXTUAL PoLmcs 8-18 (1985) (finding in works of Julia Kristeva 
and Virginia Woolf a rejection of the dichotomy between male and female, rather than selection 
of male treatment for women or elevation of status for women's traditional differences from 
men); Olsen, The Sex of Law, TELOS (forthcoming) (contrasting women's rights arguments 
saying that women are like men with those saying that women's traditional traits are as good as, 
or better than, men's; both arguments also can be contrasted with efforts to disentangle gender 
from traditional gender roles and from the hierarchies accorded those roles). 
32. Efforts to expose hidden assumptions about who is the same and who is different, accord· 
ing to what factors, and compared to what unstated and yet specific view of the "normal," cur-
rently occupy feminists, see THE FUTURE OF DIFFERENCE (Z. Eisenstein & A. Jardine eds. 
1980); Menkel-Meadow, Feminism and Critical Legal Studies, TELOS (forthcoming), as well as 
theorists and reformers dealing with legacies of discrimination on the basis of race, handicap, and 
ethnicity. See Minow, Learning to Live With the Dilemma of Difference: Bilingual and Special 
Education, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157 (1985). 
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tent ones. 33 Yet neglect of potentially inconsistent or antagonistic 
meanings for the norms that propel and inspire reforms could well 
give rise to disappointing results - and acknowledgment of compet-
ing meanings might help explain disappointments. 
Weitzman's case study of California divorce reform demonstrates 
still additional meanings of equality competing for attention and ad-
herence. For example, she exposes contrasting meanings of equality 
when it comes to dividing property after divorce. On the one hand, 
there is the idea of equal division of all assets (and debts) attributable 
to the marriage partners. 34 Yet another conception stresses equality of 
results: the assets and liabilities should be divided so that the two 
spouses are situated the same, with the same standard of living as the 
other, after the divorce (p. 105). Since they may be situated differently 
in relation to the job market and competing demands on their time 
(from matters like childrearing), divorcing couples that use an equal-
ity-of-results standard would likely not divide the assets and liabilities 
equally to secure this end. 3s 
_Implicit in these contrasts between equal division and equal results 
are competing justifications for equality after divorce. Is the justifica-
tion for equality a theory that each spouse contributes equally to the 
marriage? If so, contribution may well be the rationale for setting 
boundaries on the corpus to be divided upon divorce. Is the justifica-
tion for equality a notion of equal capabilities? If so, the ideal could 
set limits on the resources to be shared based on conceptions of what 
both husband and wife need to develop their capabilities; thus, we see 
the development of "rehabilitative alimony" or short-term payments 
33. See J. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 24, at 231-32, 242-49 (inconsistent thought may reveal 
sophistication or contrasts between pragmatic and normative thought or between different sets of 
norms); Minow, Rights of One's Own, 98 HARV. L. R.E.v. 1084 (1985) (reviewing E. GRIFFITH, 
IN HER OWN RIGHT: THE LIFE OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON (1984)) (inconsistencies in 
Stanton's thought express the conundrums of women's experiences in a world constructed by 
men). 
34. But defining the pool of assets and debts to be so divided is itself a source of considerable 
contest and confusion, as Weitzman's discussion of pensions, professional degrees, and other 
forms of new property demonstrates. Pp. 59-60, 110-42. Equal division of tangible assets with-
out equal division of future expected income, through pensions and other forms of expectations, 
would defeat the aim of equal division, and yet Weitzman reports this pattern in California 
practice. Pp. 141-42. Weitzman notes the striking anomaly that the courts tend to treat the 
family home - but not the husband's business - as a divisible asset. Pp. 396-97. Explicable on 
grounds that the community of interest represented by the marriage never absorbed the hus-
band's business in a way that it occupied the home, this anomaly demonstrates how equality may 
have become a plausible claim within the traditional woman's sphere of the home - but not a 
plausible bridge between the traditional male and female spheres of work and family. Demon-
strations of the degree to which the husband's job success is attributable to his wife's support -
and demonstrations of the disadvantages to the wife from fulfilling this role - have not yet fully 
integrated the public and private realms for purposes of rearranging financial interests for hus-
band and wife after divorce. 
35. Still further debate over the financial arrangements following divorce arises if principles 
besides equality are invoked - principles like "need," p. 149, or "fairness," pp. 104-09, 360, that 
are both implicit in standards like "equitable division." See pp. 72-73. 
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to wives to help them "retool" to become self-supporting. Is need the 
justification for equal treatment? If so, equal satisfaction of need may 
justify redistributions ·rather than equal divisions; "equal concern for 
the good lives of its members ... requires society to treat them differ-
ently. "36 Or is the justification for equality a notion of each person's 
equal worth, regardless of contribution, capability, or need? If so, very 
different practices may seem necessary to implement equality. Indeed, 
the resources necessary to respect equal worth may demand solutions 
that look beyond each isolated nuclear family. 
Weitzman gives contexts for such contrasting conceptions by com-
paring the California experience with data on English law and prac-
tices governing divorce. The English experience that Weitzman 
describe$ emphasizes equality of living standards after divorce for both 
spouses. It also elevates other principles, like security and welfare of 
the children, to give meaning to equality - or else trump it - in this 
context (pp. 194-204). This contrast permitted by study of compara-
tive law especially highlights two further debatable assumptions about 
the meanings of equality. One is the assumption that the persons to be 
compared are separate, autonomous people with no ongoing relation-
ships with others, and the second is the assumption that there are ac-
tually enough resources to divide among members of a divorcing 
family to maintain the same standard of living for all members that 
they enjoyed before the divorce. Without intending to discuss at any 
length the faults of these assumptions, I suggest that both are at least 
debatable, and that these debates have been unresolved by the concep-
tion of equality that has fueled divorce reform. 
The assumption of autonomy can be countered by the demonstra-
tion that divorcing families with children usually reform into two 
households - one where the children live primarily, and one where 
they don't. Treating the divorcing spouses as though they both were 
separate, autonomous persons ignores this pattern. But there are more 
subtle challenges to the idea of autonomy for both spouses after di-
vorce. The spouses may continue to have important relationships with 
one another, especially if they both remain involved with the children 
or if neither develops other important relationships. Or, one or both 
spouses may develop new affiliations, and further challenge the as-
sumption of separate individuality and autonomy. Through remar-
riage, cohabitation, or sharing household life with one or more friends, 
children, grandparents, or other people, a divorced spouse transforms 
himself or herself into a member of a group rather than a separate, 
autonomous person. And as a group member, this individual is likely 
to undertake new obligations and benefit from obligations others un-
dertake, in tum. Whatever conception of equality animates distribu-
36. Frankena, The Concept of Social Justice, in SOCIAL JUSTICE 20 (R. Brandt ed. 1962). 
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tions of property and child-custody decisions at divorce, which 
persons or grq'ups of persons are to be imagined for equal treatment? 
As for the second assumption - that there will be enough to go 
around after divorce to approximate for all parties the pre-divorce 
standard of living - this is probably 'an obvious falsehood, even for 
the tiny percentage of very wealthy people. For most people who di-
vorce, spreading between two households the financial basis for one 
requires a considerable drop in living standards. The equality ques-
tion, then, is how to distribute this drop-off equally between the house-
holds. Psychologically, and practically, it is likely that any 
distribution will feel unfair to people in both new households. Weitz-
man notes how California judges interpret the equality norm upon di-
vorce to require the sale of the family home - typically the largest 
asset - even though this sale forces disruption in the children's lives 
as well as a halving of the assets available for each spouse's new home. 
As divorce settlements and decrees scramble to divide the resources 
previously available to each nuclear family between the two new 
households, it may be worth asking why, precisely, the equality mea-
sure here is drawn in reference to the prior isolated household rather 
than to the other households on the block, or other families or chil-
dren in the community. Especially with conceptions of equality 
founded on need or respect, rather than contribution or investment, 
the privitized support obligations that are tied to families now legally 
ended begin to seem quite artificial and unfair. 37 Of course, looking 
beyond the nuclear family would dramatically shift the relationships 
between individuals and the community, and individuals and the state. 
But not looking beyond the family is itself a normative position, im-
posing a particular view of rights and obligations, and inequalities tol-
erated by law. 
Pressing behind the search for equality after divorce is the funda-
mental question of whether families will cease to be the primary social 
organization that tends to individual needs. 38 Will a decision to marry 
no longer carry even short-term - much less permanent - economic 
obligations to the spouse? And what about obligations to children, or 
elderly parents, or other relatives? The economic devastation faced by 
so many women and children after divorce expresses the abandonment 
of the most economically vulnerable to the vicissitudes of a market-
37. See c. SMART, THE TIES THAT BIND: LAW, MARRIAGE AND THE REPRODUCTION OF 
PATRIARCHAL RELATIONS 225-31 (1984) (noting. arguments for an income maintenance ap-
proach to child support; this approach, however, still would not bring parity with the standard of 
living offered by male wages; future solutions must address women's wages as well). This book 
argues that recent British law reforms governing marriage and divorce reproduce and reinforce 
women's dependency. It thereby offers a theoretical framework more critical than and yet com-
patible with Weitzman's. 
38. See M. GLENDON, supra note 11 (suggesting that in both law and social practice, em-
ployment and government benefits eclipse the family as vehicles for creating and protecting indi-
viduals' economic security). 
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place and governmental system that presume individual economic 
needs are fulfilled by the family unit, a family unit that includes a 
wage-earning man. Studies like Lenore Weitzman's make this pre-
sumption less and less plausible, and expose not just the inequality but 
also the unacceptable quality of the lives of too many women and chil-
dren in this society. 
In sum, equality, as a criterion for judging law reform, has con-
tested meanings. Contests over equality's meanings explain in part 
why eliminating (or truncating) alimony could be both advocated and 
criticized in the name of equality. Similarly, reformers can invoke 
equality as a reason to end maternal preference in child-custody 
decisions at the same time that critics cite the end of the maternal 
preference for child custody as a new disadvantage for already disad-
vantaged women. Different meanings of equality could justify includ-
ing - or excluding - various assets from the divisible pool upon 
divorce. And some meanings of equality challenge the usual bounda-
ries between .public and private, home and work, and family and soci-
ety, when it comes to the problems facing families of divorce. 
C. Contested Meanings of Freedom: One Person's Freedom Is 
Another's Disaster 
Besides equality, a justification for divorce reform recently - and 
in the more distant past - has been the promotion and protection of 
individual freedom. Women and men should be able to free them-
selves from bickering or hellish marriages: Indeed, it's hard quite to 
reimagine the world view that condemned two unhappy people to the 
private misery of a mutually disagreeable marriage. 39 Perhaps the 
contemporary view emerged when the ideal of the companionate mar-
riage replaced notions of marriage for economic security and raised 
expectations about satisfactions in the marital union - and thereby 
inspired more dissatisfactions, and more desires to leave unhappy mar-
riages. 40 Whatever the sources of demands for divorce, those demands 
helped to push waves of reforms easing legal exit from marriage. By 
eliminating fault requirements for divorce, and authorizing unilateral 
39. That world view is not, however, long gone. See Rankin v. Rankin, 181 Pa. Super. 414, 
424, 124 A.2d 639, 644 (1956) (citations omitted): 
Testimony which proves merely an unhappy union, the parties being high strung tempera-
mentally and unsuited to each other and neither being wholly innocent of the causes which 
resulted in the failure of their marriage, is insufficient to sustain a decree. If both are equally 
at fault, neither can clearly be said to be the innocent and injured spouse, and the law will 
leave them where they put themselves. 
40. See R. GRISWOLD, FAMILY AND DIVORCE IN CALIFORNIA, 1850-1890: VICTORIAN IL· 
LUSIONS AND EVERYDAY REALITIES 174-76 (1982); E. MAY, GREAT EXPECTATIONS: MAR• 
RIAGE AND DIVORCE IN POST-VICTORIAN AMERICA (1980). Both these works study the 
increasing rates of divorce in California long before the recent reforms, and both raise a central 
question also posed by Weitzman's findings: does the California experience represent or predict 
experiences in other parts of the country? 
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actions by one spouse to end a marriage, recent divorce reforms 
around the country seem to advance individual freedom. 
Weitzman notes how these transformations use law to reward indi-
vidualism rather than partnership in marriage: Celebrating individual 
independence after marriage, 1 the reforms in property, custody, and 
support rules also "confer economic advantages on spouses who invest 
in themselves at the expense of the marital partnership" (p. 374). 
Weitzman criticizes these developments for several unanticipated con-
sequences: the reforms give no rewards for good behavior, or altruistic 
behavior in the marriage (p. 29); and the reforms help to dislodge 
moral condemnation of divorce and thereby undermine the notion of 
reciprocal obligations in marriage (p. 23). Finally, privileging individ-
ual freedom in essence harms the weak.er party in the union (pp. 19, 
26). Freedom untethered by equality, in this view, unleashes selfish-
ness and exposes the less powerful to the will of the more powerful. In 
short, one spouse's freedom can be the other spouse's disaster. 
While I do not contest these assessments, I suggest that such unan-
ticipated consequences can be traced to complexities in the idea of 
freedom itself. Despite popular views that freedom is at odds with 
both equality and dependency, there are other plausible meanings of 
freedom that actually rely on equality and dependency, submission 
and limits, dependency and interdependence. Divorce reforms that 
failed to account for these competing meanings of freedom thus rightly 
can be criticized in their light. And we should not be surprised by 
charges that such reforms actually undermine at least some versions of 
freedom. 
Just as a starting point, the notion of "ordered liberty" in the Con-
stitution rests on the recognition that there are societal preconditions 
for individual liberty. Only if groups agree to respect individual free-
doms - and to enforce such respect even at the cost of interfering 
with other individuals' freedoms - can anyone be free, or so goes the 
general refrain. I can be free only if you are disciplined, and you can 
be free only if I am disciplined enough to protect your freedom. Yet 
the paradox could be even more immediate, as put by the dancer who 
said that only through discipline can the dancer himself be free. This 
seeming irony at the core of legally enforceable freedoms has occupied 
much scholarly attention, but also united foes.41 
When it comes to family relationships, this irony only deepens. 
For only if people choose to turn their freedom to some mutual goals 
can they form relationships; the freedom to form relationships would 
mean little without a willingness to pursue something besides freedom 
41. See, e.g., J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (Norton ed. 1975); T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Penguin 
ed. 1976). See generally Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Ben-
tham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 975 (analyzing conundrums in classical legal concepts used 
to monitor this irony). 
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to leave them. And yet even this understates the irony. For only by 
preserving the possibility of leaving - the possibility of individuality 
- can anyone survive to connect in relationships.42 From one angle, 
then, individual freedom demands submission to societal ground rules; 
from another, freedom demands submersion of individual whim into 
binding attachments; from still another, freedom requires limits even 
upon the limits on freedom. Such contrasting meanings of freedom 
have been bound up in our culture with views about dependency and 
independence, and with views about gender roles. The very freedom 
of the traditional male role - to participate in public life and move in 
and out of the private family realm - depended upon the traditional 
female role that maintained continuity in the family realm and pro-
vided a person, the wife, who could be subject to the husband's freely 
exercised power. The sense of freedom in relationships could be sus-
tained by men who had women who made relationships for them; but 
"[t]he fact that men have always dominated women has obscured the 
fact that they are mutually dependent . . . ; in a fundamental sense, 
men need women as much as women need men."43 
Reform efforts to promote freedom by disentangling individuals 
from gender roles may, however, enforce new constraints on freedom: 
the result could be new obstacles to affiliation that make it harder for 
individuals to exercise their freedom to build relationships. Following 
their study of what Americans care deeply about, a group of social 
scientists recently concluded that 
[t]raditionally, women have thought more in terms of relationships than 
in terms of isolated individuals. Now we are all supposed to be con-
scious primarily of our assertive selves. To reappropriate a language in 
which we could all, men and women, see that dependence and indepen-
dence are deeply related, and that we can be independent persons with-
out denying that we need one another, is a task that has only begun.44 
Freedom may mean freedom to choose isolation, but then it must also 
mean freedom to choose connection. And freedom for women to 
abandon traditional roles as nurturers and wives should not yield only 
the freedom to exercise traditional male roles, for that would mark 
42. Parents want to give the maximum to their children and, at the same time, keep a little 
for themselves; otherwise, as they see it, they would be swallowed up. In one of his works, 
Henry Moore, the great sculptor, has depicted a mother gathering her children to her and, 
at the same time, pushing them away. It is easy to see from the way her progeny are behav-
ing that if she didn't push them away, they would devour her. A provider has to defend 
herself from her dependent . . . . If she doesn't defend herself, she perishes in her role as 
provider .... 
A. MEMMI, supra note l, at 68. 
43. Id. at 155; see also Benjamin, The Oedipal Riddle: Authority, Autonomy, and the New 
Narcissism, in THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORITY IN AMERICA 195 (J. Diggins & M. Kann eds. 
1981). 
44. R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWIDLER & S. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE 
HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE Ill (1985), 
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boundaries on freedom to nurture, or freedom to construct entirely 
new roles that make possible connections between people. 
Failing to imagine some of these contrasting meanings of freedom 
does not immunize law reform from disappointmg them. And there 
are grounds for disappointment in the "freedom" advanced by recent 
divorce reforms beyond the special issues posed by the devastating 
economic impact to women, due to inherited gender roles in both fam-
ily and employment. Yet another meaning for freedom grounds each 
separate self, in search of freedom, in relationships with others. From 
this vantage point, even the felt commitments to freedom are forged 
socially. Despite a language of radical individualism, we exercise our 
freedom in relationships to others; indeed, "[w]e discover who we are 
face to face and side by side with others in work, love, and learning."45 
In short, freedom to leave a marriage must also mean freedom to 
be left; but recent divorce reforms have failed to give form to freedom 
to forge commitment, fulfilled through community and commitment. 
Thus, in retrospect, recent divorce reforms can be criticized both for 
creating too much - and too little - individual freedom. 
III. WHAT To EXPECT NEXT 
Professor Weitzman ends her important study with specific recom-
mendations: child support should be based on an income-sharing ap-
proach likely to equalize the standards of living between custodial and 
noncustodial households; support awards should have automatic in-
creases based on the cost of living; college-age children should be in-
cluded within support obligations; special rules recognizing the 
expectations and foregone opportunities of older or long-married 
wives should be adopted as "grandmother clauses" for those who 
played by the traditional rules; and all future reforms should await 
careful consideration of their economic consequences (pp. 379-83). 
These proposals look sensible and worth pursuing. 
Yet they will not solve the problem of unanticipated consequences 
in the next wave of reform. Some unanticipated consequences will fol-
low from the politics of reform itself. Reform may necessarily focus 
more on what is wrong presently than with what should be in its stead, 
and that focus may end up generating so many impossible hopes for a 
better world that some visions, and some supporters, are bound td be 
disappointed. Other unanticipated consequences will follow because 
the politics continue long after the reform-official succeeds. Opposi-
tion persists in the form of administrative obstacles, attitudinal barri-
ers, and resistance by parties and publics, and lawyers and judges, to 
formally adopted changes. And yet the particular expressions of such 
resistance can never be fully anticipated by reformers. 
45. Id. at 84. 
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I have also suggested, though, some especially deep problems that 
will continue to plague divorce reform, and will continue to surprise or 
even dismay reformers. The visions of fairness, equality, and freedom 
that help animate reform.depend on contestable terms whose mean-
ings elude consensus and consistency. The meanings that prevail will 
remain suspect against the meanings that do not yet find form, and 
nonetheless capture human hopes. And what seems a natural bound-
ary for current reforms may well seem an arbitrary cut-off in retro-
spect - or a step too far. Perhaps reformers in the last round stopped 
too far short with issues of equality after divorce when they located 
the problem within each household facing a break-up, rather than con-
necting the needs of wives and children with husbands' employment, 
businesses, and even broader public resources. And perhaps the re-
formers went too far in pursuing a version of freedom that underesti-
mates the dependence of freedom itself on interpersonal connection. 
Perhaps if they knew now what Lenore Weitzman has shown, some of 
the reformers would not have taken the steps they did. 
What seems most likely is that we will not know the next set of 
contested meanings and disappointments until we take further steps, 
and see what we cannot yet see. A dismal thought? Yet, it could be 
this very condition of imperfect knowledge that allows us to push to-
ward what others know to be impossible.46 
46. In Norton Juster's The Phantom Tollbooth, Milo rescues Rhyme and Reason, and says he 
could never have done it without everyone's help. The king says: "[T]here was one very impor-
tant thing about your quest that we couldn't discuss until you returned. . . • It was impossible." 
And the king and his brother confirmed: "[I]f we'd told you then, you might not have gone -
and, as you've discovered, so many things are possible just as long as you don't know they're 
impossible." N. JUSTER, THE PHANTOM TOLLBOOTH 247 (1961). 
